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Abstract (216 words) 
Sport diplomacy is often reduced to actions centred on states. However, after the Cold War 
international relations and diplomacy has expanded, with different actors growing into 
significant roles. This is particularly true in the increase of diplomatic relations in the context 
of sport. The classification and significance of other actors is under researched, with literature 
focusing more on the growth of new and varying forms of diplomacy and diplomatic 
instruments. This article contends that there is a need to interrogate fundamental components 
of modern diplomacy- here the actor being the focus- more specifically, the classification of 
sports organisations in diplomatic relations. This is relevant as a more accurate understanding 
of sports organisations will contribute to how diplomatic studies can analyse and evaluate 
modern diplomacy that takes place in the context of sport. The International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) is the actor used to illustrate how problematic classifications currently in 
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literature translate into weak and reduced analysis and evaluation of its role and significance 
in diplomacy. To combat this the analytical framework of socio-legal theory is advocated, as 
it harnesses legal regulation as a benchmark to classify an actors capacity within a society. 
From this the IOC can be credibly seen as an active and significant contributor to the ever 
expanding and complex diplomatic environment and wider society.    
 
Main Article (8274 words) 
Introduction 
Imagine an undemocratic, unelected, transnational, multibillion dollar, not for profit non-
governmental organisation having the power to leverage and affect the legal landscape of a 
nation state. Imagine further that such legal changes have the potential of impacting on 
altering states political, economic and social fabric. This is no hypothetical exercise, but a 
description of the current manner in which the International Olympic Committee (IOC) 
operates on the international stage. There are few studies of this phenomenon, in particular on 
the classification and credibility of the role of sports organisations in international relations 
and diplomacy. In a recent survey of academic work on sport and politics, Martin Polley 
celebrated the move away from the early sport politics literature - with its narrow focus on 
“international relations and diplomacy”1 by such scholars as Richard Espy2 and John 
Hoberman3- to those with broader political interest. This paper is a contribution to a 
(re)emerging interdisciplinary literature focusing on international relations and diplomacy.  
The contention in what follows is that the IOC is inappropriately classified for the many roles 
and influences it has on diplomacy.4  This goes beyond mere linguistic accuracy, for the 
actions and influence of the IOC do not tally with the current run-of-the-mill acronyms given 
to classify such actors in academic literature. These include non-state actor, international 
3 
 
sports organisation (ISO), and international non-governmental organisation (INGO). 
Fundamentally there is a disjoint between the actions and the classification of the IOC- this 
mismatch translates into a misunderstanding and diluted analysis and evaluation of its role in 
diplomatic relations. Consequently, there is a need to revisit how sports organisations are 
conceptualised in diplomatic discussions, both methodologically and analytically. The IOC is 
an ideal case study, as it unconventionally balances multiple roles of business, governance, 
event hosting, regulator, social activist and so on. The multitude of activities and roles 
undertaken under the umbrella of Olympism renders the organisation an anomaly in the 
traditional understanding of actors in international relations, diplomacy, and many other 
social science disciplines.  
The conceptual slippage of sports organisations is challenged because ramifications include a 
vague and reductive understanding of the IOC and its role in diplomacy. To contest this the 
theoretical framework of the socio-legal approach is introduced, as it will enable the complex 
entity of the IOC to be better understood and evaluated as a global organisation acting at 
numerous levels with varying significance. Socio-legal theory draws upon traditional and 
non-traditional legal evidence that empirically and validly shows how law and regulations is 
(re)created. It is not the intention of this article to completely define and analyse the IOC. But 
instead offer an analytic tool with which to classify it through empirical and clear 
conceptualisation, therefore encouraging more rigorous and credible research of its 
significance in diplomacy.  
 
Diplomatic Literature and Actors 
The rise of sport as an interdisciplinary lens and context has complemented the onset of 
theory across the social sciences that challenge the more traditional state-centred, positivist 
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understandings of the world. Positivist accounts dominated international relations theory until 
the end of the Cold War, with scholars, such as Waltz, taking the nation state as the central 
actor to all global politics.5 In diplomatic studies, sport as an ice-breaker in diplomatic stand-
offs between states has been the assumed role of sport, for example the Ping Pong diplomacy 
between China and America in the 1970s.6 Such studies rely on archives and government 
documents that are not available until around thirty years after the event. In contrast when 
considering the IOC in the current era diplomatic scholars rely on media, interviews, public 
documents amongst other secondary sources, as this is what is available. This is problematic 
when credibly evaluating the significance of sport diplomacy and poses a difficulty for 
researchers to argue that sport plays a role in diplomacy beyond being an ice-breaker.  
The difficulty in studying contemporary actors in diplomacy is supported by Heather Dichter, 
who cites the rarity in diplomatic studies of considering a government’s public diplomacy 
strategy through hosting a sports mega-event. This is largely because of the increased scale of 
sport mega events in the past twenty five years and therefore research relies on new stories, 
rather than government documents.7 The reality of the constraints of researching diplomacy 
in the present-day is a significant issue for sport scholars who are attempting to understand 
and explain the impact and significance of the sports organisations. A way in which this has 
been overcome is to apply vague and cautionary conclusions, with more confidence placed in 
framing new strategies of diplomacy rather than actors. For example, Steve Jackson has 
recently labelled sport to be “schizophrenic” as it “is considered both serious and important 
but insignificant and trivial at different times.” The author suggests a form of “corporate 
diplomacy” to frame sports organisations but not a way in which to classify or evaluate sports 
organisations as actors.8 This example contributes to a pattern where common themes of 
vague classification and lack of empirical markers are evident in multiple sport diplomatic 
research pieces. This unproductively leads to labels and conclusions around terms, such as, 
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“schizophrenic” that in reality does not further understanding of sports organisations, instead 
further confuses it.  
Sport diplomacy literature is grounded in two strands; “sport as diplomacy” and “diplomacy 
in sport.”9 The latter is concerned with how governments consciously employ sport as an 
instrument to leverage their interests in wider diplomacy- as seen in the Ping Pong example 
mentioned above. A more modern case is the recent strategy of the Bosnian government to 
gain international recognition through the IOC in order to gain momentum and leverage with 
the wider international community. This case is consistent with more traditional diplomatic 
theory that is state centred and views the nation state as the contingent actor in diplomacy. In 
terms of classification Dario Brentin and Loic Remy evaluate the role of the IOC as low level 
diplomacy, therefore difficult to judge its impact.10 Stuart Murray and Geoffrey Pigman 
further demonstrate this by stating that the Olympics itself is a site and form of sport 
diplomacy, but it is “complicated”. The authors therefore vaguely classify the organisation as 
a great power.11 The vague and hesitant conclusions of “low level” and “complicated” stem 
from the initial inaccurate classification of the IOC as an actor, instead rely on claims such as 
it is a “great power.” The need is therefore to reconceptualise sports organisations with a 
view to credibly classifying and in turn evaluating the significance in diplomatic relations.  
There are examples of authors seeking to classify sports organisations; Burak Herguner seeks 
to place the IOC within international relations theory, namely Huntington’s 1973 
characteristics of transnational organisations. This classification is based on the structure and 
membership of the organisation, similar to that of literature around non-state actor. Burak 
Herguner states that the “IOC may be classified both as a transnational organisation and an 
international non-governmental organisation,” thus making the IOC a “TNO-INGO.”12 The 
empirical evidence is produced through the concept of soft power which allows the IOC to 
“as a transnational organisation… maintain a balance between national governments, the 
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business environment and civil society.”13 This concept is productive but does not explicitly 
offer a concept that can be marked or evaluated. Instead it reduces the opportunity to 
rigorously understand the IOC as an actor in itself or how it balances and leverages states, 
business and civil society. In discussing the IOC further on it is shown to be an active actor, 
not a passive or balancing organisation of others varying needs.  
Literature that has moved away from regarding sport as purely an instrument of state based 
diplomacy are framed around “sport as diplomacy,” this places sport as a site of diplomacy in 
more multi-actor and specialized circumstances.14 In this shift the actors and strategies are not 
purely state to state or based on leveraging national interests. For example, Barbara Keys 
focuses on the development of the approach of Human Rights Watch to leverage the 
Olympics against states that are seen to breach human rights.15 Here the author sees the role 
of Human Rights Watch as central in developing an argument of how diplomatic strategies 
are advanced against a state through sport. However, research such as this is not as 
widespread in comparison to more traditional state centred diplomatic literature.16 This is due 
largely to the lack of access to credible evidence; therefore what would be relevant is another 
avenue to explore modern sport as diplomacy.  
The shift in diplomatic literature to consider non-state based diplomacy has been explored 
outside of sport literature. This is to argue that that the nation state has been replaced but that 
it is no longer always the primary actor in modern diplomatic relations. Richard Longhorne 
summarises that a combination of the end of the Cold War, the information revolution, 
increasing and diverse experts, the rise in the number of states and the dispersion of national 
interests has “increased the significance of global institutions and globally operating private 
entities, both public and commercial.”17 Moreover, the environment of diplomacy has shifted, 
as Joseph Nye suggests, “power in the world is distributed in a pattern that resembles a 
complex three-dimensional chess game” with the unipolar military power on top, multipolar 
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economic power in the middle and the realm of transnational relations” the bottom board.18 
The growing complexity and multitude of diplomatic relations and power further challenges 
more traditional conceptualisation of actors. Burak Herguner amongst others classifying 
sports organisations within traditional frameworks are no longer adequate because they are 
too static and fixed. 
The evolving complexity of diplomacy has been engaged with in sports literature, however, 
the tendency has been to focus on the new forms of diplomatic strategies such as: digital, 
public, corporate, network, club, rather than the actors.19 For example, Aaron Beacom, 
proposes the concept of “Olympic diplomacy” that due to the varied nature of actors and 
agendas, “does not lend itself to conceptual clarity.”20 The IOC is cited as a key actor, but in 
more specific reference it is categorised as “an international organization and with aspirations 
to extend its influence in international affairs.”21 The author frames varying categories of 
diplomacy within the Olympic Movement based on a multitude of activities, however, the 
influence gained is not obviously measurable and therefore reduces the ability to evaluate. 
This branches from the lack of conceptual clarity cited by the author, consequently, although 
the discussion of proliferating diplomatic strategies through sport is productive it does not 
adequately deal with the analytical ability to classify the main actors. This aligns with the 
themes identified that vague classifications lead to static conclusions, this is largely due to the 
lack of empirical evidence, and lack of framework to produce such evidence. 
In a novel approach this article will interrogate a sports organisation as an actor through legal 
sources and evidence, this is made possible by using the theoretical approach of socio-legal 
theory. Socio-legal theory is a turn in legal studies that has argued for an interdisciplinary 
approach to investigating the relationship between law and society. This is because 
historically legal scholars have concentrated on traditional sources of law, such as state based 
legal doctrine. This is comparable to the traditional international relations and diplomatic 
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literature using state based and traditional underpinnings. Studies in socio-legal theory have 
shown that law has been seen as unidirectional and as having a top down influence over 
society22, but that this state-centric approach to law should be challenged.23 Moreover in the 
changing landscape of national and international the state is seen less as the primary regulator. 
Consequently, theory must respond to this and view society, plus a larger variety of actors to 
have an impact on law and regulation. This again relates to the problematics identified in 
diplomatic literature and sports organisations, as wider actors are playing an increasing role 
in such contexts.  
In order to understand the IOC as a source of law or regulation, legal pluralism offers an 
understanding of law and regulation beyond traditional legal structures. Varying spaces, 
actors and structures can be viewed as sources that produce and reproduce law.24 
Fundamentally legal pluralism challenges a traditional and positivist reading of law, trying to 
shift towards a more open and responsive view.25 This aligns with the thought taken in this 
article that the state and assumed fixed structures must be decentred, leading to a more exact 
understanding of other actors. Consequently, the evidence provided in the case study 
classifies and analyses the IOC as an actor from its ability to regulate varying spheres. It 
offers markers of evaluation that can then contribute to wider research on diplomacy that use 
the actor in its analysis. It also does not isolate this tool to the IOC, but in further research can 
be used to form a spectrum of sports organisations.  
Socio-legal theory has been used in a sport context before, for example, Bo Carlsson uses the 
framework to show how the consumption of popular culture through sport video games is “a 
significant source of normative (re-)production of law and morality in society.”26 The 
changing nature and source of society is less systematic and structural, but more based on 
fluid norms and the influence of varying actors.27  The role of norms, identities and 
individuals are increasingly being used in diplomatic literature, in particular around 
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understanding the role of sports organisations. For example, Simon Rofe frames the football 
club Manchester United around its balance of identities in football, commerce and 
international finance.28 What socio-legal offers is a complementary analytical tool to further 
provide empirical evidence and markers to make such research increasingly credible and 
rigorous. This elevates the problem highlighted by Heather Dichter around archives being 
unavailable to provide evidence around modern diplomatic issues. Largely because legal 
regulation as a source of classifying sports organisation can use documents, records, and 
statistics amongst other outlets that are publicly accessible or can be requested. 
 
The Current Classification of the IOC 
The clear aim of this article is to offer an analytical tool with which to classify a sports 
organisation in order to further diplomatic discussions. An important step therefore is to 
identify what and how sports organisations are classified in a number of disciplines, with the 
focus being the IOC. Sports organisations in their simplest form arrange sports competitions 
and are responsible for sports development and sustainability. However, the IOC is more 
complex in its current form. The organisation both theoretically and in reality displays traits 
from varying traditional actors such as a MNC, INGO or non-state actor. Depending on what 
discipline is evaluating the role of the organisation different roles are highlighted. For 
example, in a purely legal context the IOC has been treated as exceptional, and as having a 
credible legal capacity.29  Mark James states that the IOC is recognised “under Swiss Law as 
an association with a distinct legal personality.”30 Not only does this follow the pattern of 
diplomatic literature above as being vague in the use of “exceptional,” it also supports the 
need to revisit the IOC as a complex and interdisciplinary organisation.  
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The origins of the IOC are attributed to founder Pierre de Coubertin, who post the French 
defeat in the Franco-Prussian War 1870-81 had the desire to make French male citizens 
stronger through the means of sport.31 Further influences expanded this desire and vision, 
ranging from travel and the technology advances. According to Allen Guttmann, Coubertin 
“was increasingly drawn to the humanistic vision of a peaceful world. Sports were still the 
means, but the ends had been transformed.”32 Over a century of development later, the 
Olympic movement balances not just sport, business and politics, but also ethics and many 
other projects within the ever changing realm of the international community.  
The IOC is seen as an MNC because owns the rights to and facilitates a global sports mega-
event every two years. The global scale can be highlighted by the estimated cost of hosting an 
event, the past four being Beijing 2008 ($43bn), Vancouver 2010 ($8.9bn), London 2012 
($13.9bn) and Sochi 2014 ($51bn).33  These astronomic costs are covered by the host nation 
and the IOC, through sources such as television rights, sponsorship and public funding. The 
global reach of the Games can be highlighted through London 2012’s television coverage that 
exceeded 100,000 hours of Games, and had record television viewing figures in the UK, 
America and online viewing figures in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.34 This marks the IOC as 
a global institution being in control of one of the most sustained and largest international 
events- the Olympics. From this the reach makes the organisation truly global in nature with 
the ability to reach a diverse audience.  
The sponsorship of the Olympics from private organisations is what crucially makes the IOC 
independent of state funding and a private firm. The sponsorship is secured through the ‘The 
Olympic Partner’ programme. In the current cycle ending at the summer games in Rio de 
Janeiro the programme has accumulated over one billion dollars, with a view to the next 
cycle to reach two billion dollars.35 From a purely economic perspective the IOC as an actor 
is a MNC because this money is produced and used to grow and sustain the organisation. 
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Much literature and popular press has questioned where exactly this money goes, a subject 
beyond the scope of this article, but one worthy of further debate.36 What is important to note 
is that the scale and the global nature of the business the IOC conducts render it akin to a 
MNC with the financial acumen to leverage its own interests.37 
The other significant role the IOC plays is around moral responsibility and its dissemination 
of the values of Olympism globally. Olympism encapsulates the thoughts that inspired 
Coubertin to revive the movement in the first place, as sport can positively benefit 
communities around the world. This is articulated through the Olympic Charter, a document 
that each member must agree to in order to compete at any Olympic Games.38 The Charter is 
a main source of regulation in socio-legal terms for the IOC, with the historical essence of 
Olympism capturing the spirit of competition that global athletes display and disperse among 
spectators. Olympic spirit is more important for IOC than medals or winning. This is made 
clear in the Olympic Charter in which the IOC does not base its membership on elite 
performance or medals tables but through its dictum: “Olympism as a philosophy of life…the 
practice of sport is a human right.”39 The document and its values overlay the leveraging 
opportunity provided by the size and scope the Games to form an organisation that does not 
seek to extend or protect territory, but use sport to achieve a multitude of objectives. The gulf 
between rhetoric and reality within the Olympic Charter is a subject heavily contested in the 
academic literature however not in the scope of this article.40  
What is more pertinent in this discussion is that in existing practice the IOC advocates this 
philosophy actively in varying facets. For example, Sebastian Coe stated at the most recent 
Olympic Congress that sport is a “hidden social worker…a source of international 
understanding…uniquely powerful bridgehead in addressing seemingly intractable 
problems.”41 From this point of view the IOC positions itself as a social activist that seeks to 
fulfil its moral code outlined in the Olympic Charter. This has been more explicitly 
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communicated by the organisation as from 2015 there is a preamble in press releases and 
other communication outlets that states: 
The International Olympic Committee is a not-for-profit independent international 
organisation made up of volunteers, which is committed to building a better world 
through sport. It redistributes more than 90 per cent of its income to the wider 
sporting movement, which means that every day the equivalent of USD 3.25 million 
goes to help athletes and sports organisations at all levels around the world.42 
 
This statement illustrates the awareness of its position and the need to show that it uses a 
considerable wealth and reach to be a credibly ethical international organisation. From a 
classification perspective the IOC straddles both an MNC, such as Coca Cola and also 
INGOs, such as, Green Peace. The contemporaneous IOC could be classified as a private 
firm with a purpose of doing public good making in a global arena, making its classification 
as an actor in diplomatic relations difficult. 
The IOC is also more and more mixing its leverage as an economically powerful body with 
its ethical aspirations. This is shown in the partnership with the United Nations (UN), the 
most powerful international governmental organisation. As of 2009 the IOC has been granted 
observer status to the UN, and has pioneered such initiatives as the Olympic Truce.43 An 
example of this being in September 2015, the IOC committed a two million dollar fund in 
response to the humanitarian disaster around refugees.44 This fund is being distributed 
through National Olympic Committees (NOCs) which are satellite organisations in nation 
states, comparable to IOC embassies. The IOC has taken this active and independent role 
more aggressively since the end of the Cold War, driven by Juan Antonio Samaranch (a 
former diplomat himself) IOC President between 1980 and 2001, who made the organisation 
more efficient and self-sufficient organisation.45 This development assisted the IOC in 
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becoming more significant in diplomacy. However, markers and classification of this are 
difficult to show- the strength of socio-legal theory is that through legal and regulatory 
mechanism the evolution can be reflected. 
The current President Thomas Bach has set out to further evolve the organisations and 
perceptions that it is corrupt and sedentary organisation, by implementing reform in the shape 
of ‘Agenda 2020’ (that is 20+20 [=40] recommendations for reform).46 This is seen as a 
‘roadmap’ for the future of the Olympic movement, and gives a clear indication that internal 
reform will make the IOC ‘fit for purpose’ in the 21st century. The success and measure of 
such rhetoric will become apparent in the coming years. A problematic fact is that in its 120 
year history, the IOC has had just nine presidents- five from European nobility and all male.47 
This unrepresentative make up has been described as “an old boys club.”48 Interrogating this 
claim is beyond the scope of the article, but it is acknowledged. What is more pertinent will 
be the endeavours of Presidents to develop the organisation to the needs of wider global 
landscape in active manner contributing to how it can be classified.  
The active manner, including reform and continuing sporting and non-sporting projects 
challenge existing understandings of the organisation. For example, Barrie Houlihan has 
argued that the IOC is able to merely “voice and protect sports interests when they are subject 
to debate in other policy communities.”49 This as evidenced by the UN observer status and 
refugee fund can be undermined as the power and significance of the IOC has grown, a claim 
supported by a breadth of literature.50 What is missing is an adequate analytic tool to marker, 
evaluate and identify how powerful and significant the IOC. This here is achieved by 
classifying the organisation through the novel approach of socio-legal theory. This will 
address both the complexity of the IOC, but also the need to find a common language and 
currency from which to classify and then interrogate its capacity as an actor in varying 
disciplines, more specifically here diplomacy.   
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Influence of the IOC on traditional legal doctrines 
The significance of the IOC’s influence on traditional legal doctrines is highlighted by the 
evolution of the bidding process. From the first modern Olympic Games in 1896 up until the 
mid-twentieth century hosts and bids were made and decided in an informal manner.51 This 
has escalated to the present situation where the IOC has an independent evaluation committee 
for each round of bids and there is nearly a decade’s worth of preparation needed to bid and 
host an Olympics by a host city and state. Allen Guttmann among other authors has traced the 
change and reform citing the growing demand and need to be impartial in the process as 
catalyst to this escalation.52  In consulting Olympic documents there is an even clearer change 
to the organisations approach over time. The bidding process develops significantly towards 
technocratic and bureaucratic methods that demand increasing control and concession from 
the host city and nation state. Moreover there is a distinct change in the level to which the 
IOC expects a host and participants to accommodate its legal (amongst other) requirements. 
This change can be illustrated by contrasting two bidding questionnaires from 1963 and 2004. 
Firstly, in a 1963 Questionnaire to potential applicants of the 1968 Winter Olympics, the IOC 
asks questions listed from A-N ranging from provision for a fine arts programme to the 
proposal of the Olympic village location. The only reference to a legal framework is in 
question ‘N’: 
Will you guarantee that the Games will be conducted properly and in accordance with 
Olympic Rules and Regulations, if they are awarded to your city?53  
This informal question is implying the respect of the Olympic Charter and the Olympic 
movement, but does not prescribe any concrete way of achieving this, instead it is more based 
on good faith between the state and host nation. In contrast the questionnaire sent out in 2004 
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for the 2012 Summer Olympics is over 250 pages long with requirements and questions split 
into themes. There are four pages dedicated purely to the “Legal aspects.” This includes a 
codified covenant obtained from the government, local and regional authorities to respect the 
charter, understand the commitments are binding and to fulfil obligations to the protection of 
the Olympic mark and governance of the games.54 
The contrast between 1963 and 2004 represents a shift in the IOC’s outlook and organisation. 
Informal and top down administration has been replaced by copious documents and 
committees to review bid applications. Reasons as to why this shift have happened include 
the need to protect the Olympic symbol and ethos, to gain impartiality and independence 
from nation states and the temporal growth of the size and ambition of the hosting the 
Olympic Games. The independence of the IOC is further demonstrated by the mechanism of 
having NOCs in each member state of the Olympic movement, and specifically for hosting 
there is an ad hoc organisation created, such as London Olympic Committee of the Olympic 
and Paralympic Games (LOCOG). These organisations - although based in the nation state - 
are designed to be satellite organisations regulated through and by the IOC. This shows how 
the IOC has gained greater autonomy and continues to use this for regulatory influence and 
monitoring of the Olympic Movement in nation states. 
This independence of the IOC and its influence on members and hosts of the Olympic 
movement is a key dimension to justifying it as a global regulatory institution. Literature has 
considered this growing influence over the nation state. For example, Mestre’s classification, 
in an article interpreting the IOC’s influence, is based not on force but due to the 
“transcendent socio-economic quality the Olympic Games possess.”55 A socio-legal theory 
framework can marker this influence through an example in the London 2012 Summer 
Games, as in committing to hosting the event the UK government allowed LOCOG to create 
and control the event. The government itself published documents outlining its support and 
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ambition for the games56, however, the Government’s role was used more to protect and 
guarantee hosting the Olympic movement. For example, the “London Olympic Games and 
Paralympic Games Act 2006” was introduced.57 This law extensively lays out how the 
national Government will accommodate regulatory demands from the IOC. Such as, there are 
regulations and enforcement around the “Protection of the Olympic Symbol,” this allows the 
IOC to monopolise who is authorised to sell, distribute and profit within London from the use 
of their Olympic symbol.  
In practice it was reported that in 2012 over three hundred enforcement officers will patrol 
British businesses to uphold this, and that at forty Olympic venues “800 retailers have been 
banned from serving chips to avoid infringing fast-food rights secured by McDonald’s.”58 
This evidence above from open access bidding documents, legal documents and media 
reports allows an overview of how the IOC through hosting of the Games has gained 
unprecedented power to regulate varying elements of a state through legal mechanisms. This 
snapshot is credible evidence to classify the IOC as an active global regulatory institution.   
However, as a snapshot it is not generalizable, largely as it is contextual to nation states that 
host the Olympics; moreover the IOC does not necessarily enforce or hold the nation state 
accountable beyond the requirements it prescribes. Meaning the nation state is still active in 
the process. Interrogating this further there are examples of backlash from groups and nation 
states to the control demanded by the IOC. Such as, in the 2022 Winter Olympics bidding 
race the IOC had only two candidates (China and Kazakhstan) to choose between, with 
originally having seven show interests.59 Norway withdrew from bidding for the 2022 Winter 
Olympics in a very public and resistant manner, as the media leaked unreasonable demands 
made by the IOC.60 This lead to a growth in public concern over the cost, and ultimately to 
the parliament not agreeing to provide financial guaranties. One of the reports cited demands 
around the cartel nature of advertising “even street vendors must be removed,” but it was 
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framed around the distrust of allowing such commercial control not necessarily legal. This 
backlash highlights that the growth and influence of the IOC is not one directional but varies 
depending on what international actors and states it is engaging with. This therefore makes 
the analytical tool of legal regulation more relevant as such a tool allows a researcher to 
compare and contrast the level of influence and leverage the IOC has over another actor, in 
this case the varying nation states proposing to host the Games. 
In reaction to the changing perceptions and role the IOC is realigning its projects and 
organisation so that it does not solely rely on the hosting of events and individual host states. 
Two examples of that being further permanent codification of the Olympic Charter and a 
more stable access to a global audience through television. Firstly, the IOC is supporting 
international bodies and states to cement the Olympic Charter in their constitutions. To date 
Turkey has incorporated the entire Olympic Charter into its legal system, and the European 
Union codified the acknowledgement that there are “obligations arising from the Olympic 
Charter.”61 This wider and more permanent strategy is not widespread, but shows the scope 
and ambition the IOC has for its regulatory mechanism which is tangibly the Olympic 
Charter.  
Secondly, the internal reform of the IOC through the “2020 Agenda” is targeting a more 
sustained contact with a global audience.  This is shown in one of the recommendations to 
“launch an Olympic Channel”62 this stems from the continued emphasis of digital techniques 
of communication and networks, which can reach a multitude of individuals. In the realms of 
digital and public diplomacy this could become a mechanism in which the IOC directly 
engages with citizens globally. Internationally there are limitations on TV rights and internet 
exposure; however, if a nation state legally allows the IOC this channel then the IOC will 
have a clear and directive influence within states, towards citizenry on a more permanent 
basis.  
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The future ambitions and growth of the IOC and its Olympic Charter can be monitored 
through legal mechanisms created through internal reform and agreements reached with 
varying organisations. This shows how continuing research into the IOC can harness a socio-
legal classification of the organisation as a benchmark to evaluate and interrogate varying 
strategies and situations.  
 
Influence of the IOC on non-traditional legal regulation 
The traditional legal doctrines influenced by the IOC are largely tangible and based around 
economic or political spheres, however, as noted the IOC attempts to influence more 
intangible societal issues. A strength of using socio-legal theory and legal pluralism is the 
ability to integrate non-traditional and more nuanced ways in which the IOC regulates legal 
issues in society at a social and cultural level.  
A major social issue that the IOC has on its agenda is gender equality, this is somewhat ironic 
as Coubertin initially banned women from participating and there was considerable energy 
taken to sustain women’s participation.63 In the present moment in the Agenda 20-20 papers 
there is a continued commitment to “stimulate women’s participation and involvement in 
sport,” a complementary policy to the organisational entity of the Women and Sport 
Commission that was formally recognised as an advisory group to the IOC Executive 
Committee in 2004.64 Not only is this a priority of the IOC, but it is a distinguished self-
measurement of the progress it has made through its ethical governance. For example, to 
celebrate the IOC’s success in this area an emotive video was released on International 
Women’s Day 2015. This has images and videos of women throughout the Olympic 
movement, accompanied by statistics that show the percentage of female participants in the 
London 1908 games were 1.8%, whereas, in London 2012, this has risen to 44.2%.65 This is 
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not only another example of the use of digital media to access global citizenry, but also how 
the IOC believes itself to be pioneering gender empowerment over the past century.  
On the surface, these statistics are very impressive, however when further explored 
contextual and micro differences become apparent. A study into female representation of 
NOCs shows that the IOC actively seeks to show how gender empowerment through the 
Olympic Charter is being upheld. The IOC has set a minimum target of 20% women on 
Executive Committees of NOCs and Ifs. Results show that Asia (12.6%) and Europe (14.1%) 
failed to meet the threshold, whereas Oceania (26.2%) and the Americas (20.5%) met the 
suggested target.66 Such goals stemming from the Olympic Charter evidence that active 
regulating and imposing its societal based aspirations are achieved at varying levels in the 
organisation and its satellites, such as the NOCs. What is interesting is that the more 
successful geographical areas of the globe does not include Europe, therefore this evidence 
goes beyond a predicted and generalised influence but delves into specific global regions. 
The use of organisational targets is a non-traditional source of legal regulations as it alters the 
structures and decisions taken in recruitment and training for example. Not a codified 
restriction but a regulatory pressure.  
Another way to interrogate the claimed progress of the IOC in this area of gender 
empowerment is through the further break down of participation of females in specific 
countries. For example, as cited above Turkey has codified the Olympic Charter in their legal 
system. Yet there is tension in Turkey as female empowerment clashes with the cultural and 
religious norms of the significantly Muslim country. Leila Sfier notes that Turkey in 1936, 
was “one of the most Westernized Muslim countries, [was] the first to send two women 
athletes to the Olympic Games”, however the author goes on to discuss that the conditions are 
still based on Islamic request of “absolute segregation of the sexes.”67  Consequently the IOC 
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has incrementally improved female participation, but this is not systemic as Turkey does not 
embrace in full Olympism as it applies to participation through segregation.   
This incremental change was also observed during the London 2012 Games where Muslim 
states, Saudi Arabia, Brunei and Qatar all sent female athletes for the first time. These 
countries have not allowed the IOC Charter to play such a dominant role in their behaviour, 
however, did concede to pressure to “allow women to participate in the Olympic Games.”68 
This incremental change based on participation or governance statistics is not true of all areas 
of the IOC and the contributing nations. For example, Turkey during London 2012 had 69.57% 
male Paralympic athletes69 and then of 27 accredited coaches with the IOC Turkey had 0 
female coaches.70 The more negative statistics here show that the incremental change in 
participation cannot be overstated to a systemic change in behaviour towards women- what 
can be evidenced is that the IOC does have credible influence through its Charter and 
regulation.. Consequently, the use of a socio-legal analysis allows for a greater and more 
nuanced analysis of the IOC as an actor and its significance. The evidence from data 
available, domestic laws and IOC reports show that although it is actively promoting female 
empowerment. Although it cannot be overstated it gives a marker to whom and how it is 
regulating and influencing as an actor. 
A challenge to this could be that states conform in order to gain support from the IOC to host 
a future Olympic Games. For example, Istanbul (Turkey) has bid for the summer games five 
times, most recently in 2013 it lost the selection to host the 2020 Games.71 This is a key 
consideration and one that can be used to further evaluate the significance of the regulatory 
ability of the IOC. The significance is strong considering the example of states such as 
Turkey who do follow the IOC mechanism- granted that maybe for certain ends. However, 
there are examples of states challenging the mechanisms outlined by the IOC, such as Russia 
and the dispute over sexuality at the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics.72 The varying conformity 
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and influence of the IOC outlines the complexity and ungeneralizable effects on different 
actors, this is to be expected in the intricate landscape of international relations and 
diplomacy. What is a strength of using a socio-legal standpoint to classify the IOC is that the 
legal regulation can be compared across contexts and actors- such as the cases of Turkey and 
Russia. This further affirms the aim of exploring the tool to further the classification of the 
IOC, rather than providing a traditional label and judgement of the organisation. The flexible 
yet rigorous tool can contribute to research of both tangible and intangible regulatory 
influences, and the ability to classify the IOC as an actor beyond merely reducing the 
organisation to a MNC or INGO. From this as touched in the case studies the understanding 
of the IOC in contemporary diplomatic relations can be more credibly interrogated.  
 
Conclusion: where next? 
The aim of this article was to offer an analytical tool for discussion on the classification of 
the IOC and other sports organisations. This is not simply a linguistic argument, but rather 
one that warns the mislabelling of the IOC across disciplines translates into a 
misunderstanding of its role- as shown in diplomatic literature this has led to vague 
conclusions and a lack of evidence to credibly marker arguments. The case for re-thinking the 
classification of the IOC has been justified by showing that the IOC operates complex and 
multiple roles - as a multinational corporation, a transnational organisation, an international 
sports organisation, to name but a few. The complexity and multifaceted composition of the 
IOC lends itself to a more dynamic and interdisciplinary device, socio-legal theory provided 
an adequate framework to produce a device and therefore a clearer classification. This 
complements this growth dynamic growth of modern diplomacy. 
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The extant sport diplomacy literature and debates have shied away from classifying the IOC 
in its contemporary form, instead focusing more on the increase in diplomatic strategies more 
generally and how the IOC contributes to this through traditional classifications. This article 
has introduced an interdisciplinary socio-legal tool to show that the IOC both in theory and 
practice wields unprecedented international influence over social, political and economic 
legal regulation in varying levels and on varying audiences. The evidence and classification 
of the IOC as a global regulatory institution connects to diplomacy as it offers a wider 
evidence base and a more adequate label of the organisation. The phrase global regulatory 
institution is recommended from the discussion as it more accurately reflects the agency of 
the IOC in international affairs than the current acronyms.  
The distinction between traditional and non-traditional sources of legal regulation allowed 
this article to explore both tangible and intangible changes to the international and to a state’s 
political, economic and social fabric. There is a gap in knowledge of how the IOC influences 
a larger variety of levels both tangibly and intangibly- here the cases of host nations and 
female empowerment were two of many that could be further harnessed through the socio-
legal classification. Furthermore such research would be useful in making more context and 
community specific evidence for how the IOC as a global regulatory institution impacts 
different actors. As mentioned different organisations such as the UN or Human Rights 
Watch are interacting with the IOC to leverage diplomacy, moreover, there is a growing trend 
of undemocratic and non-western states bidding for the Olympic Games. The relationship and 
regulation between the IOC and such actors would be important to further strengthen the 
analytic tool advocated here.  
A wider challenge from this article is to develop and extend this classification to a spectrum 
of sports organisations. How does Manchester United or the International Association of 
Athletics Federations for example measure up as regulatory institutions, not only in terms of 
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sport, but in terms of diplomatic strategy and leverage? This article has conceptually 
grounded such a spectrum and promotes that an expansion of it with more sports 
organisations is fundamental to sport and diplomacy studies moving forward.  
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